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The Netherlands do not seem to fit well within this research project. All 
commentators, both inside and outside the Netherlands, agree that the reception 
of the European Court's direct effect/supremacy doctrine has gone very 
smoothly in the Netherlands, without major doctrinal controversies or judicial 
hesitations. Comparative studies of the domestic reaction to the supremacy and 
direct effect doctrines do not dwell on this country, and quickly move to other, 
more interesting cases such as those of France, Italy, Germany or the UK. We 
will not challenge that view here; the constitutional setting of the Netherlands 
is indeed optimal if compared to those other countries. Yet, the reaction to the 
direct effect/supremacy doctrine has not been without some ambiguities. In the 
second part of the report, we will look into them, and hope to show that even 
in the Netherlands the reception of the European Court's doctrine has not gone 
without some distortions of the message from Luxembourg. 
The first part will deal with something else. Before looking at the recepti-
on of the direct effect/supremacy doctrines, we will look at their conception. 
Those doctrines did not appear out of the blue. The European Court had its own 
intellectual sources from which it derived the formulation of those doctrines, and 
those sources, apart from sparse references in the case-law of international 
courts, were to be found in national law. The link between the direct effect 
doctrine and the American doctrine of self-executing treaties is well-known, but 
the 'European' sources of the Court's doctrine are less completely explored. The 
constitutional law of the Netherlands is, arguably, one of its major sources of 
inspiration. The first part of the report will therefore deal with the contribution 
of the Dutch legal order to the emergence of the European Court's doctrine. 
L THE DUTCH SOURCES OF THE EUROPEAN COURT'S DOCTRINE 
1. Direct Effect and Supremacy of International Treaties in the Netherlands Prior 
to Van Gend en Loos 
For a long time, the Dutch Constitution did not contain any provisions on 
the relationship between international law and national law. In the absence of 
express constitutional provisions, this question (which started to appear of 
practical relevance towards the end of last century) was left to legal writing and 
to the courts for discussion and decision. In this respect, the Netherlands does 
not stand apart from the other European countries. Yet, the discussion gradually 
took a distinctive turn in the Netherlands. In the beginning of this century, a 
large-scale doctrinal controversy, involving the leading professors of constitu-
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tional and international law, took place about the contending theories of monism 
a~d dualism: we~e international treaties directly applicable (i.e., were they a 
drrect source of nghts and duties upon their entry into force or their publication) 
or did they first require transformation into Dutch law? 1 In 1906, the Hoge 
Raad -the Dutch Supreme Court- made a statement which was not entirely clear, 
but was generally interpreted as a rejection of the transformation doctrine. 2 It 
is worth noting that the Supreme Court used the argument that all treaties 
affecting the rights of Dutch subjects needed prior approval by Parliament, so 
that a subsequent act of transformation would not serve a discernable purpose. 3 
From that time onwards, monism became the leading doctrine among Dutch 
authors; as for the courts, their attitude was summarised as follows by Erades: 
"despite the employment of vague, confusing or ambiguous terms in some 
judgments, Netherlands case law as it was when the 1953 Constitution became 
?perative, treated international agreements as rules of international law binding 
mtemally, and not as rules of municipallaw."4 , 
A second controversy had developed by then, which was predicated upon 
the first. It dealt with the rank of international treaties, and more specifically 
with the primacy of international law over later statutes in the case of a conflict. 
There were no clear judicial statements about this; rather, like in other countries, 
Du.tch cou~s tried. to avoid the issue by adopting rules of construction aiming 
at mterpretmg national law in accordance with international treaties, and vice-
versa. 
At a conference of the Dutch Association of Jurists in 1937, two 
conflicting views were proposed by the rapporteurs, both professors of 
inte~ational law.5 Telders acted as a late defender of the dualist approach, 
argumg that a treaty, after its publication, produced internal effect as a national 
norn;t with the same rank as a formal statute. His opponent Verzijl defended the 
momst doctrine, combined with full recognition of supremacy. He considered 
international and internal law to be part of one system, in which treaty law had 
1 For a summary of the debate, see L. Erades, 'International Law and the Netherlands 
Legal Order', in International Law in the Netherlands (1980) Voi.III, 375, at p.394 and ff. 
2 H.R., 25 May 1906, W., 8383. 
3 See the translation of the relevant part of the Supreme Court judgment in Erades, op.cit., 
at p.397. 
4 Erades, op.cit., p.402. 
5 Handelingen van de Nederlandse Juristen Vereeniging (1937). 
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a higher rank, and the judge had to disapply any conflicting national rules. At 
a vote concluding the 1937 conference, the majority of lawyers present preferred 
Verzij1' s theory. Yet, Verzijl had to admit that the most likely attitude of Dutch 
courts (if a conflict could not be interpreted away) would be to make the later 
statute prevail over the earlier treaty. One of the reasons that made him think so 
was the attitude of courts in all other countries which made it unlikely that 
Dutch courts would take the bold step of affrrming the supremacy of 
international law in the absence of any constitutional authorization to that effect. 
Such an authorization came in 1953 when, in the slightly post-
war period, a series of new external relations clauses were inserted in the Dutch 
Constitution, all of them inspired by an internationalist spirit. 6 The important 
novelties for present purposes were the following: 
* Article 66 now held: "Agreements shall be binding on anyone insofar as they 
will have been published".7 Although those words do not say so explicitly, they 
were meant to confirm the dominant view that treaties could be directly applied 
by domestic courts. The article also resolved a doctrinal controversy among 
monists about the moment from which a treaty displays its domestic effect, by 
settling upon the date of publication rather than the date of entry into force. 
Though publication could still theoretically be seen as operating transformation 
of the international treaty into Dutch law, this view was never defended either 
by a court or by legal writers, so that from 1953 monism reigns without dispute 
in the Netherlands. 
* More importantly, article 65 resolved the controversy about the rank of 
international treaties by stating unambiguously: "Legal provisions in force within 
the Kingdom shall not apply if the application should be incompatible with 
agreements which have been published in accordance with Article 66 either 
before or after the enactment of the provisions." 
The essence of this provision lay in the word 'before' which confrrmed that a 
treaty could not even be set aside by subsequent national laws. This bold 
assertion had not been proposed by the government but was inserted in the 
Constitution on the basis of an amendment voted by the Second Chamber with 
6 For a complete analysis of those changes, see H.F. van Panhuys, 'The Netherlands 
Constitution and International Law', 47 American Journal of International Law (1953), 537. 
7 Translations of the 1953 Constitution are taken from van Panhuys, op.cit. 
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a narrow majority of 46 votes to 40.8 Thus, it was Parliament itself that took 
the initiative of submitting' its future statutes to judicial review of their 
compatibility with treaties. This step is all the more striking if one considers 
that, in 1953 as today, there is no judicial review of the constitutionality of 
legislation in the Netherlands. Since 1953 therefore, treaties are more effectively 
enforceable than the Constitution. 
* The relationship between the Constitution and treaty provisions was dealt with 
in two articles. The notion "legal provisions in force in the Kingdom" in article 
65 was deemed to include the Constitution, that must therefore give way to 
treaty provisions.9 This was confirmed in article 60(3): "the judge shall not 
review the constitutionality of Agreements". 
* The rules formulated in articles 65 and 66 with regard to treaties were made 
applicable, by virtue of the new article 67, also to decisions of international 
orgqnizations. This provision w·as inspired, among other things, by the recently 
signed Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community. 
The Dutch constitutional reform was greeted by professor De Visscher, 
in his course at the Hague Academy, as providing the most audacious solution 
to the question of the relation between international and domestic law. 10 In the 
Netherlands itself, a lonely voice rejected the new regime, 11 but its fundamental 
principles were never to be called into question by a significant part of either 
politicians, courts or legal authors. 
Immediately after the 1953 revlSlon, the Government set up a new 
advisory committee with the task of preparing some 'technical' revisions of parts 
of the 1953 text that were considered infelicitous. Acting upon the recommen-
8 The amendment is known as the Serrarens amendment, from the name of its author. 
Serrarens became, shortly afterwards, the first Dutch judge at the European Court of Justice. 
9 Handelingen EK, 1952-1953, 2700, no 63a (Memorie van Antwoord), p.3 
10 P. de Visscher, 'Les tendances intemationales des constitutions modemes', in Recueil 
des Cours 80 (1952-ll), SI!, at pp.S69-570. Yet, the author added a warning: "L'experience 
seule etablira si un systeme aussi progressiste n'est pas de nature a provoquer entre le pouvoir 
legislatif et le pouvoir judiciaire des conflits politiques dont ce demier pourrait etre la 
victime." The experience of the next 40 years showed that major conflicts did not arise, but 
that must be partly due to the fact that, as will be indicated below, the courts smoothened the 
sharp angles of the new regime. 
11 Duynstee, Grondwetsherziening 1953 (1953) 
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dations of the committee, the Government introduced a new constitutional 
amendment bill which was adopted by Parliament' in 1956Y One modification 
was the reversion of the sequence of the above mentioned provisions, as it 
appeared more logical to deal with domestic effect first (new article 65), and 
with supremacy after that (new article 66). A second change was not merely 
'technical': it introduced the condition of "binding on anyone" in both articles 
65 and 66. The 1953 text, by its sweeping terms, might have given the 
impression that all agreements were to be enforceable by Dutch courts. 13 The 
intention was to restrict it to what were called, in the American doctrine, 'self-
executing treaties'. In order to remove any doubt about this, article 65 was 
henceforth formulated as follows: "Provisions of agreements which, according 
to their terms, can be binding on anyone shall have· such binding force after 
having been published." 14 The same qualification was added to the supremacy 
clause (now article 66): "Legislation in force within the Kingdom shall not apply 
if this application would be incompatible with provisions of agreements which 
are binding on anyone and which have been entered into either before or after 
the. enactment of such legislation." 
The words 'binding on anyone' stem from the text of 1953; its article 66 
expressly said that such general (and horizontal) obligation could only arise once 
a treaty was published. The clause was meant to protect citizens; they could 
only be bound by a rule if they could know it. 15 In the 1956 version, however, 
the same words are used to insert a supplementary condition for treaties to 
become binding in the domestic legal order, and for the judge to have the 
competence to disapply conflicting national legislation. This condition, rather 
than protect the individuals, makes it more difficult for them to assert the 
benefits provided for them by a treaty. 
12 See H.J. van Panhuys, 'The Netherlands Constitution and International Law', 58 
American Journal of International Law (1964), 88. 
13 This was never the opinion of the Government. Already in 1953, the Government 
deemed both articles to be limited to "self-executing" provisions. In the Memorandum on the 
revision of 1953, the term "self-executing" was explained by the Government as meaning 
"provisions that according .to their nature can be applied directly by the judge" and further 
as "provisions that are directly effective vis-a-vis the citizens", as opposed to norms of 
instruction addressed to the legislative and executive organs. The question whether a norm 
· was directly effective or not was "in full confidence" left for the judge to decide, since this 
amounted to an interpretation of the provision. TK, 1952-1953, 2700, nr 63a, p.3 
14 The newly inserted part is emphasized. 
15 Handelingen TK, 1951-52, 2374, no 11 (Memorie van Toelichting) 
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The binding effect and the supremacy of treaty provisions is henceforth 
made subject to the capacity of those provisions to be "binding on anyone". As 
mentioned above, the American doctrine of 'self-executing' treaties inspired this. 
Yet, it is by no means clear when a treaty provision is capable to bind indivi-
dals. Which were to be the criteria to decide whether treaty provisions complied 
with that condition? Was it the wording of the provision (only those expressly 
conferring rights to individuals)? Was the intention of the Contracting Parties 
decisive? Or was it the possibility for courts to apply those provisions without 
the need for prior implementation by either the Legislature or the Executive? 
The 1956 additions were presented by their authors as technical updates of the 
1953 revision, as the self-executing criterion was, according to them, implied in 
the 1953 formulation. Yet, the fact of specifying this condition so openly could 
also be interpreted as an invitation to the courts to use that criterion as a means 
for restraining the disruptive effect of international treaties on the domestic legal 
order. That, at any rate, was what happened in the court practice of the late 
1950's. The courts tended to shy away from their newly recognised power to 
review legislation on its compatibility with international treaties, either by 
relying on the rule of construction (interpreting national law in accordance with 
treaties, and vice-versa) or by denying the self-executing nature of international 
conventions. 16 The first device is a natural attitude for courts, and one which 
is practised in many countries. The second device is more typical for the Dutch 
courts of that period, and was probably encouraged by the insistence of the 
Constitution (in its post-1956 version) that treaty provisions needed to be 
"binding on anyone" before they could be the basis for reviewing domestic 
legislation. 
Slightly more than one year after the 1956 revtswn, the EEC Treaty 
entered into force. In its early years of operation, several business companies 
sought to enforce the competition rules of that treaty, articles 85 and 86, before 
Dutch courts. 17 The general trend of those courts' judgments was that, in the 
absence of implementation rules to be issued by the organs of the Community 
under article 87 of the treaty18 , the articles 85 and 86 could not be regarded as 
16 See M. Waelbroeck, Traites internationaux et juridictions internes dans les pays du 
Marchi commun (1969), at pp. 250-251 
17 This special interest for the competition rules was probably due to the fact that their 
enforcement was provisionally delegated, according to article 88 of the Treaty, to "the 
authorities in Member States", which could be seen to include the courts. 
18 Regulation Nr.17 of 1962 had not yet been adopted then. 
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'binding on anyone' and could therefore not be enforced in court. 19 There was 
also a debate on the underlying issue of whether the existence of direct effect 
was a matter of interpretation of Community law or of national law and related 
to this, which court was competent to decide on the matter. In K/M 
Sieverding20, Advocate-General Eyssen of the Hoge Raad held that it was a 
matter of domestic law.21 
The Hague Court of Appeal took a different view and decided to suspend 
the proceedings in order to obtain a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice 
on the proper interpretation of article 85 EEC Treaty22, more particularly on 
the question of whether a contract between a German exporter and Dutch 
importers was void by virtue of Article 85(2).23 This reference under article 
177 EEC Treaty, in the Bosch case, was the first to be decided by the European 
Court of Justice.24 Although the question whether article 85 had direct effect 
was not formulated expressis verbis by the Dutch court, it could seem to be 
implied in the question whether the contract was "void by virtue of article 
85".25 
One month after the judgment of the European Court, the Hoge Raad 
19 See the judgments mentioned in Van Panhuys (1964), op.cit., p.102, note 65. 
20 Hoge Raad, 13 January 1961, K.I.M.-Sieverding, S.E.W. (1961) 324 
21 The Hoge Raad quashed the judgment in question on grounds of national law and did 
not enter into the debate. 
22 Prior to this case, the Dutch courts had always assumed that article 85 could not be 
directly applicable. In this case however, one of the parties argued that under German law -
applicable in the case- article 85 did hproduce direct effect. The Court of Appeal therefore 
decided that there were doubts as to the effect of article 85 in the national legal order. The 
Court held that whether or not it had direct effect. was a matter of interpretation of the Treaty, 
and referred the question to the Court of Luxemburg. 
23 Preliminary Reference by the Hague Court of Appeal, 30 June 1961, in Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie 1961, No.375. 
24 European Court of Justice, Case 13/61, de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch 
GmbH et al., [1962] ECR 45. 
25 In its ruling in the Bosch case, the Court of Justice gave decisive importance to the 
adoption of Regulation 17 implementing articles 85 and 86, and implicitly denied the full 
direct effect of those articles prior to the date of adoption of the Regulation. 
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ruled on the appeal against the reference made.26 The appeal was based on the 
same arguments as those developed by Advocate General Eyssen, that the direct 
effect issue had to be decided on the basis of domestic law. The Hoge Raad 
decided that: "as is clear from article 66, the question whether provisions of a 
Treaty bind the nationals of the Member States, is, at least for Dutch law, a 
question that can only be answered on the basis of interpretation of those treaty 
provisions". It was therefore a question which could properly be addressed by 
Dutch courts to the European Court of Justice. The Dutch Supreme Court thus 
cleared the way for a stream of preliminary questions. 
But even before this acceptance of the jurisiction of the Court of Justice 
by the Hoge Raad, the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven17 -a 
specialised administrative court having jurisdiction in first and last instance in 
cases concerning industrial organization and social and economic legislation- put 
five questions to the Court of Justice, the first of which read: 'can 'articles 12 
and 37(2) of the EEC Treaty bind anyone, or are they addressed only to the 
Governments of the Member States, without the possibility for individuals to 
derive rights directly thereof?' 28 The College van Beroep was of the opinion 
26 Hoge Raad, 18 May 1962, de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH et al., 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie (1965), 115 
27 College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfs1even, 10 January 1962, S.E. W. (1962) 65 
28 According to Erades, the question was clearly inspired both by arts. 65 and 66 of the 
Constitution and by a 'self-executing' theory borrowed from the Opinion of the Permanent 
Court of International Justice of 3 March 1928. The Government explained the terminology 
of the Constitution in its Memorandum to the revision of 1953 (TK, 1952-1953, 2700, nr 63a, 
at p. 3): a provision that is binding on anyone is one that is self-executing (has direct effect 
vis-a-vis the citizens); it creates 'objective rights' or obligations for individual citizens and 
is, by its terms apt for application by the judge. Provisions that are not binding on anyone, 
are those addressed only to the law-making organs of the State (norms of instruction); they 
thus do not create rights and obligations for individuals; they are not self-executing. In the 
face of such provisions, the judge cannot set aside national legislation, because to do so 
would create a vacuum, a gap, that the judge could only fill by implementing an international 
obligation, thereby by-passing the government and Parliament. This is not part of the judicial 
function, and judicial review was thus to be restricted to self-executing provisions. A 
provision belongs to either one of the two categories made. The equation between distinct 
notions, made by the Government, did not work· for the relevant articles of the EEC Treaty 
in the case before the College van Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven: the defendant had argued 
that by their terms, these articles did not create rights and obligations, but since they only 
amounted to a prohibition, one could reasonably argue otherwise. According to the court, the 
question to which category a treaty provision belonged, was a question of interpretation 
which for the EEC Treaty had to be decided by the Court in Luxembourg. 
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that the determination of the self-executing nature of a provision was a question 
of interpretation of the Treaty which had to be made by the Court of Justice. 
As the parties reached a settlement, the questions were withdrawn. But 
another Dutch court soon after made a reference which made the name of the 
applicant firm forever famous in Community law circles: Van Gend en Loos. 
The Tariff Commission (a specialised administrative court), in the course 
of a dispute about an import tax, asked whether article 12 EEC had "internal 
effect, in other words whether individuals can directly derive rights from the 
·article that are enforceable by the judge". The referring judge did not exactly 
frame his question in the terms used by the Constitution29, although it is quite 
clear that the question was put in order to elucidate the application of the 
articles 65 and 66 of that Constitution. 30 
Yet, what started as a request for help to the ECJ in the application of the Dutch 
Constitution -a request approved by the Hoge Raad in the Bosch judgment-
became the occasion for the European Court to formulate its well-known 
doctrine on the direct effect of CommJlnity law which it addressed, beyond the 
obscure Dutch Tariff Commission to all courts in all member states of the 
Community. 
2. The Influence of the Dutch Legal Order on the European Court's Doctrine 
At the conceptual level, there is hardly any doubt that the Netherlands 
have been an important testing-ground in the course of the 1950's (but even 
before that) for the principles of direct effect and supremacy as they were 
formulated by the European Court in the 1960's. 
Also the time and manner by which the European Court's views were 
29 Erades critised the Tariff Commission for confusing 'internal effect' and 'direct 
applicability', and for wrongfully identifying the former notion with a definition of 'self-
executing' borrowed from the Permanent Court of International Justice (L. Erades, De 
verhouding van de rechtspraak van het Hof der Europese Gemeenschappen met die van de 
nationale rechters in de Lid-Staten, Praeadvies, Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging 
voor Intemationaal Recht (1964), at p. 22) 
30 See L. Erades, op. cit., at p. 5: 'The relation between the Arts. 65 and 66 of the 
Constitution and Art. 177 EEC has as a consequence that that Court has a specific task in the 
enforcement of the Dutch Constitution.' And further: 'Given the existence of the Arts. 65 and 
66 of the Constitution, Art. 177 is more important for the Netherlands than for the five other 
Member States.'(my translation) 
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formulated may bear the stamp of Dutch influence:31 
a) The willingness of Dutch courts to refer preliminary rulings in the early days 
of the EEC32 (which itself was a result of existing Dutch rules about the relati-
onship between national and international law), the acceptance of the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice by the Hoge Raad, and the type of questions asked by 
the Dutch courts allowed the European Court to formulate its direct effect 
doctrine in Van Gend en Loos. 
b) The word 'effect' in the expression 'direct effect' was possibly borrowed 
from the preliminary question put by the Tariff Commission. 33 The question 
whether the Court of Justice wanted to indicate, by the use of those words, 
something different from the 'direct applicability' mentioned in article 189 EEC 
has puzzled commentators for many years. 34 
c) Dutch law, through the questions referred, may have complicated the issue 
of direct effect by the terminology used. The Tariff Commission put the 
question of direct effect in terms of the creation of individual rights, probably 
because that is the pattern of the Dutch Constitution. 35 Direct effect was 
equated with the creation of objective rights (or obligations) for individuals, and 
the applicability by the judge. The Court of Justice followed this approach in 
V an Gend en Loos and seemed to equate direct effect with the creation of 
individual rights ('article 12 must be interpreted as producing direct effect and 
creating rights which national courts must protect'). The Court repeated the 
31 The existence of this influence is testified by Donner, who was the Dutch judge in 
Luxembourg at the time of Van Gend en Loos (and may have been instrumental in the Court's 
decision in that case): AM. Donner in Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn Themis (1980), 354, at p.359. 
32 Ten out of the first thirteen references came from Dutch courts, see references in L.J. 
Brinkhorst, 'De Nederlandse rechter en het gemeenschapsrecht', S.E.W. (1966), 65, at p. 83 
33 The term 'direct effect' ('rechtstreekse werking' or 'directe werking') was already used 
in the Netherlands. See e.g. the Memorandum of the Government to the constitutional revision 
1953. 
34 AM. Donner, op.cit., at p.359; J.A. Winter, 'Direct applicability and direct effect. Two 
distinct and different concepts in Community law', C.M.L.Rev. (1972), 425 
35 See footnote 23 
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formula in numerous cases36, although the equation between direct effect and 
the creation of rights is deceptive, both for the national (procedural) law of 
many Member States and for Community law. It complicates the direct effect 
issue even today.37 
Direct effect and the creation of rights do not always coincide, unless the 
term "right" is understood as comprising a procedural right to invoke the 
relevant provision. But this too seems artificial and needless in some cases.38 
The rights issue obscures the direct effect issue, and this may, in the beginning, 
have been a direct consequence of the Dutch legal thinking on the subject. 
d) The fact that the direct effect question was proposed and resolved in a 
separate case from the supremacy question (Costa v ENEL) may be explained 
by the fact that the referring court in Van Gend en Loos did not need guidance 
about supremacy: if an EEC provision was declared to have direct effect, then 
it automatically had supremacy according to Dutch constitutional law. It remains 
debatable whether this initial distinction between direct effect and supremacy in 
the European Court's case-law was a good or a bad thing, but it has certainly 
marked the later evolution in case-law and legal thinking. (There are signs in 
more recent judgments of the European Court that the two principles are 
merging into an overarching principle of 'effectiveness'). 
e) Article 66 of the Dutch Constitution, which made direct effect a condition for, 
and limit to, the supremacy of treaty provisions, was echoed by similar 
connections made in the European Court's case-law. This is perhaps most 
evident in the later cases on the domestic effect of directives, where the review 
power of national courts was made dependent on the prior assessment of the 
direct effect of the directive. If such a connection exists between the case-law 
36 See for instance in Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453 : "Article 31 ... lends itself 
perfectly to producing direct effect ... Thus article 31 creates rights which national courts must 
protect" 
37 See for a discussion of this problem S. Prechal, Directives in European Community law 
(1995), at p.l24 and ff. 
33 For example in a recours objectif, review of the objective legality of a national rule. 
Direct effect can also be defined in terms of the applicability of the provision by the judge. 
A directly effective provision is a provision that is legally perfect and that can be applied by 
the judge. SeeS. Prechal, Directives in European Community law (1995), at p. 266 and ff. 
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of the European Court and Dutch constitutional doctrine, this would arguably be 
~ne_ of the more unfortunate.influences of the latter. The fact that supremacy is· 
hm1ted to provisions with direct effect has been criticized, within the context of 
Dutch constitutional law, with the argument that those treaty provisions that 
need implementation by the domestic authorities (and do not, therefore, have 
direct effect) are more likely to be breached by national authorities and therefore 
more in need of judicial affirmation of their supremacy. That argument is also 
true for Community law. The supremacy of EC law is often more threatened 
when its provisions are not directly effective. 
f) Another possible Dutch echo in Van Gend en Loos is even more speculative. 
It relates to the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrines of direct effect and 
supremacy of Community law. Judge Donner, president of the Court in the Van 
Gend en Loos case, was a Dutch Professor of constitutional law. In a handbook 
on Dutch constitutional law, published before the judgment in Van· Gend en 
Loos, Donner reflected upon the relation between national law and treaty law as 
it stood before the revision of the Constitution of 1953 which decided the issue 
as a matter of positive law. Considering the situation of a conflict between an 
international treaty provision and a subsequent provision of national law, he 
wrote: 
"My opinion was that when this situation occurs, the international act 
must be deemed to have precedence, not because it originates from a 
higher community of law39 , but because, as Verzijl has put it, "for the 
future the sovereign freedom of action of the state is limited and the legal 
possibility has been taken away to excercise its legislative function in full 
freedom, if he should try to do so" .40 
The author concluded from this that the judge had to review national 
legislation in the light of the treaty provisions and that he was obliged to give 
precedence to the rule of international law. In other words, the direct effect and 
supremacy of a treaty derive, in his view, from the fact that sovereign powers 
were transferred or limited by means of the treaty. The review power of national 
39 This was the opinion of a school of thought, among which Krabbe, who identified 
international law with supranational law, under the premise that national sovereigMy is only 
a derivative from international law. International' law has a higher rank in the hierarchy of 
norms, since it derives from "the wider community of law". For this school the acceptance 
of the competence of the judge to review national law was a only a logical consequence of 
the character of international law. 
40 C.W. Va~ der Pot, A.M. Donner, o.c., at p. 193 
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judges does not need to be expressly recognised by the Constitution; this power 
can only be denied by an express provision in the Constitution. 
In Van Gend en Loos, the direct effect doctrine was founded on strikingly 
similar arguments. Judge Donner (and through him, a traditional current of 
thought from the Netherlands) may well have had a decisive influence on the 
doctrinal foundations of the European Court's case-law on the relation between 
Community law and nationallaw.41 
II. THE RECEPTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT'S DOCTRINE IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
1. The General Picture 
There is a general consensus in the literature, since the 1960's, that with 
regard to the domestic status of EC law, the Netherlands "presents the least 
difficulty" .42 In view of the receptivity of the constitution to international treaty 
law, the application of Community law did not require (as it did elsewhere) a 
painful reconsideration of established doctrine. The case-law of the ECJ so far 
has always fitted into the Dutch system: the principle of direct effect, s~prema~ 
cy, interpretation of national law a la Mar/easing, or even Francovich have 
never required the judges to re-arrange national law in a dramatic way. It all fits 
into the system of the Dutch Constitution and Dutch judges have accepted the 
doctrine of the European Court on those matters as the governing law. 
Since 1983, the Constitution has been amended, but without any conse-
quences for the relationship with Community law. As part of the general 
revision of the Dutch Constitution !n 1983, the provisions on external relations 
41 It is worth noting that the theoretical underpinnings in Van Gend en Loos were not 
essential for the case: as will be explained below, the 'limitation of sovereignty' used by the 
Court as a basis for its direct effect doctrine has no bearing on the Dutch situation. In a Dutch 
case note on Van Gend en Loos, the theoretical 'lecture' by the Court was accounted for as 
reaction to the political crisis in European integration caused by the failure of the accession 
negotiations with the United Kingdom (Samkalden, S.E. W. (1963) 107, at p.108) Another 
reason for the Court to give this extensive description of the legal order of the Community 
was of course that in other Member States, there was a need for this approach in order to 
adopt the direct effect doctrine. 
42 C.J. Mann, The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration 
(1972), at p.28. 
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were also modified. Only minor changes and shifts of e.nphasis occurred but the 
main lines of the 1953/1956 regime remained unaltered.43 The existing 
provisions were re-numbered as article 93 (on domestic effect of treaties and 
international decisions) and article 94 (recognising the competence of the judge 
to set aside national law which conflicts with provisions of treaties and decisions 
that are 'binding on anyone'). 
One may note, however, that the 1983 revision was not used for drafting 
a special provision relating to the European Communities. They continue to be 
covered by the global notions of 'treaties' and 'international organizations'. 
The constituents' view was that the articles 93 and 94 were to be applied 
to the Community treaties and to deal with the relationship between Community 
law and national law. In its advisory opinion on the proposed revision, the 
Council of State44 warned the Government against the confusion that could 
arise for Dutch judges if one kept the words "binding on anyone" in the 
Constitution. Referring to a judgment of the European Court45 , the Council of 
State reminded the Government of the fact that in the framework of Community 
law, the judge could be under a duty to review national legislation in the light 
of a directive. A directive is a 'decision of an international organization' that 
needs to be implemented by the national authorities and is not 'binding on 
anyone' in the strict sense of the word. Therefore the wording of the 
Constitution might inhibit Dutch courts from enforcing EC directives to the 
extent required from them by the European Court. In the end the words 'binding 
on anyone' were maintained in the Constitution. The Government referred to the 
Bosch judgment of the Hoge Raad, accepting the Court's competence in the 
direct effect issue, and maintained that the Constitution offered sufficient leeway 
for the reception of the case law of the Court of Justice. Deleting the words 
'binding on anyone' would, according to the Government, be even more 
confusing, since judges may then rnistakingly think that they should change their 
whole attitude towards international treaties. Furthermore, outside the scope of 
Community law, the words were deemed necessary to refrain the judges from 
interfering with the competences of the other State organs, in cases where 
43 E.A. Alkema, 'Foreign Relations in the Netherlands Constitution of 1983', Netherlands 
International Law Review 1984, 307 (see his conclusion at p.330). 
44 This institution, like its French model, has advisory and adjudicatory functions. 
Opinions given as part of its advisory function are not binding. 
45 Case 51/76, Verbond van Nederlands Ondernemingen v. Inspecteur der lnvoerrechten 
en Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113. 
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implementation was required by a treaty. But the Government indicated that 
provisions requiring implementation may sometimes be considered as 'binding 
on anyone', with all the consequences (direct effect, supremacy) deriving from 
that qualification. 
Yet, it is not clear whether the interpretation of the articles 93 and 94 is 
relevant at all to the question of the domestic effect of Community law. There 
are, in fact, two schools of thought on the question of the ultimate ground for 
the domestic effect of Community law: does it rest upon the constitutional 
articles presented above, or does it rather rest purely and exclusively on its 
autonomous character as defined by the European Court? 
One might have thought that the Constitution would be the obvious basis. 
In most European countries, the Constitution is considered to deal, in an 
exhaustive manner, with the conditions and mode of application of legal rules 
on the country's territory.46 There is even more reason to hold that view in the 
Netherlands, because the wording of its Constitution is so well adapted to the 
requirements of international cooperation and European integration. 
Yet, one finds that most authors hold the view that the constitutional 
articles about the domestic effect of international treaties do not apply to 
Community law. 47 They argue that questions about the direct effect of Com-
munity law and its supremacy over national law (including the Constitution) 
have to be decided by the European Court and that Dutch judges are under an 
obligation to follow the ECJ' s views as part of the general obligation of article 
46 See e.g. the characteristic statement by the German constitutional judge Kirchhof: 'Das 
Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland regelt Entscheidm1gs- und Geltungsgrund 
verbindlichen Rechts fiir seinen Anwendungsbereich abschliessend' (P. Kirchhof, 
'Verfassungsrechtlicher Schutz und intemationaler Schutz der Menschenrechte: Konkurrenz 
oder Erganzung?', in Europiiische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1994 ), 16, at p. 18 
47 F.C.L.M. Crijns, Het Europees perspectief van het Nederlandse staatsrecht (1989) at 
pp. 27-28; C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht (1990) at p. 155; J.G. Brouwer, 
Verdragsrecht in Nederland (1992) at p. 3; H.R.B.M. Kummeling and J.B. Mus, 'De invloed 
van het gemeenschapsrecht op de nationale rechtsorde', in M.C. Burkens, H.R.B.M. 
Kummeling, EG en de grondrechten (1993) at p. 3; R.H. Lauwaars and C.W.A. Timmermans, 
Europees gemeenschapsrecht in kort bestek (1989) at p. 27; L.J. Brinkhorst and R. Barents, 
Grondlijnen van het Europees gemeenschapsrecht (1990) at p. 198; H.R.B.M. Kummeling, 
'De doorwerking van internationale normen, in het bijzonder EEG-richtlijnen, in de 
Nederlandse rechtsorde', in Nijmeegs staatsrecht, Bundel opstellen aangeboden aan Mr 
H.J.M. Beekman (1987) at p. 68; P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, Inleiding 
tot het recht van de Europese gemeenschappen (1987) at p.241 
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5 EC Treaty. That position has as its logical consequence (which is spelled out 
by some of those authors) that the Dutch constitutional system is entirely 
irrelevant in this matter;48 Luxembourg locuta, res finita. . 
Only a few authors take a different view. They admit that, for practical 
purposes, it does not matter which is the ultimate ground for the review power 
of the judge -in the end both constructions will normally lead to the same result-
but they argue that when a judge disapplies national law he does so on the basis 
of the authorisation granted by article 94 of the Constitution. In using this 
constitutional power, the courts may be guided by the European Court's 
doctrine, but that Court's case-law is not at the origin of their power to review 
national legislation. It is striking that authors who invoke the provisions of the 
Constitution when discussing the internal effect of Community law are often 
criticised by the colleagues for doing so.49 They face the objection that "in the 
light of Community law, these references to the Constitution are not correct". 
The almost unanimous approval of "la doctrine" for the doctrine of the 
radical autonomy of EC law is not confirmed by the views of government and 
parliament when they enacted the constitutional amendment of 1983. It is clear 
from the memoranda of the 1983 revision that the relevant articles of the 
Constitution do apply to Community law, even if they have to be enforced by 
the judge with due regard to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. 
But this does not seem to worry "la doctrine". The theoretical question of the 
ultimate ground of the domestic application of EC law is quickly disposed of, 
with the argument that the question does not have practical relevance. 
Authors of both schools hardly refer to Dutch judicial statements for 
supporting their views. This is not surprising, as the Dutch courts generally 
exercise their power of reviewing national law without indicating the legal basis 
for their action. This is perfectly in line with the pragmatic ('un-doctrinal') 
attitude of Dutch courts: if application of articles 93-94 of the Constitution leads 
to the same result as the application of the European Court's doctrine on the 
autonomy of EC law, why would judges want to stir up trouble by specifying 
the basis for their decision? In the sixties, judges did refer to articles 65 and 66 
48 See e.g. A. Kellermann, 'Supremacy of Community law in the Netherlands', European 
Law Review (1989) 175, at p.176: The "Constitution does not play a role in the question of 
whether there is supremacy of Community law". 
49 See G.H. Addink, B.P. Vermeulen on a handbook written by I.C. Van der Vlies, 
Rege!Maat(1992), 2; see A. Meij, 'Synchronisatie van rechtsorden', Publiek Domein, 1991, 
at p.l78 where he reacts to references to articles 92-94 made by Van Maarseveen. 
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(as they then were) as the origin of their competence to disapply national law 
conflicting with Community law.50 This practice faded away without any 
"revolutionary" overrulings.51 The reference to the articles was simply left out 
without being replaced by another basis: no mention was (and is) made of the 
European Court's judgments in Van Gend en Loos, Costa ENEL or Simmenthal; 
nor are there any theoretical considerations on the relation between national law 
and ·community law and the corresponding competences of the judiciary. 
An exception to the practice of omitting the reference to articles 93 and 
94 is the Afdeling Geschillen van Bestuur, one of the two adjudicatory branches 
of the Raad van State (Council of State).52 When disapplying a rule of national 
law, the Afdeling Geschillen bases its competence to do so on article 94 of the 
Constitution. Again, annotators of those judgments reject the reference to the 
articles of the Constitution as being incorrect. 53 
Now, does it matter in practice whether the competence of the judge is 
derived from the Constitution or not? Most -if not all- authors think that it does 
not really matter. That was also the view of the Government, expressed at the 
time of the latest revision of the Constitution; it declared that as far as 
Community law was concerned, the articles 93 and 94 should always be applied 
in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court. Any discrepancies 
between the Constitution and the European Court's doctrine could be removed 
50 Tariff Commission, 12 november 1963, U.T.C., 1964 n. 71; Tariff Commission, 21 
december 1965, U.T.C., 1966, n.58; CBB, 16 June 1970, AB, 1971, 50 
51 Advocate General Van Soest briefly discussed the issue in a tax case before the Hoge 
Raad (H.R., 5 januari 1983, BNB (1983) 104). He cited from the leading textbook on 
Community law (P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, lnleiding tot het recht van 
de Europese Gemeenschappen, 3e druk, 1980, 33) that 'in the construction suggested by the 
Court in Costa/ENEL ( .. ) a reference to arts. 65, 66 and 67 of the Constitution is superfluous. 
The question whether this construction can be used by the national judge is itself an issue of 
constitutional law'. And he went on to say: 'How ever this may be, the Dutch constitutional 
system accepts the said construction and it is therefore beyond any doubt that the provisions 
of EEC law that are, by their content, binding on anyone, prevail over national legislation.' 
He concluded that even though directives are not binding on anyone, they can produce direct 
effects in the relation between an individual against the State. 
52 Raad van State, Afdeling Geschillen van Bestuur, 6 September 1990, AB, 1990, nr.l2; 
11 November 1991, AB, 1992, nr.50; 17 february 1993, Milieu en Recht, 1993, 305, casenote 
G.H. Addink 
53 G.H. Add ink, casenote under Raad van State, 17 February 1993, Milieu en Recht (1993) 
305, at p. 307 
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by using this rule of construction. 
This is probably true. The choice between the Constitution or the 
autonomous nature of Community law as the ultimate basis may not be 
practically relevant at present. Yet, a Constitution can be amended and the 
Dutch Constitution could be modified and made less internationalist than it is 
now. In that situation, it would become important to know whether Dutch judges 
base their authority to enforce EC law directly on its nature or, rather, on an 
authorisation given by their Constitution. Such a constitutional change is 
unlikely, but not unthinkable. Only a few years ago, the Minister of Justice 
proposed the creation of a Constitutional Court. According to this proposal, that 
Court would be competent, to the exclusion of ordinary courts, for reviewing the 
constitutionality of acts of Parliament, but also for reviewing their compatibility 
with international treaties.54 Nothing came out of that proposal as yet, but it 
shows that constitutional amendments affecting the domestic status of EC law 
are possible even in the Netherlands. 
Ill. THE QUESTION OF 'COMPETENCE ABOUT COMPETENCES' 
This question has never been addressed in court in the Netherlands. The 
legal literature does not spend much thought on it. The issue is briefly 
mentioned in a 1994 textbook, clearly under the influence of the 'Maastricht'. 
judgment of the German Constitutional Court, but is dealt with in 
disappointingly simple terms. The authors write that the European Community 
does not possess 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz' because its powers are attributed by 
the member states. 55 
For a closer consideration of this issue, one needs first to distinguish 
between the attribution of competences, and the exercise of those competences. 
54 The proposal of the Minister was fiercely critised in legal writings and in the advice 
given to the Government by several Professors of Law. One of their critiques was that such 
system would be contrary to the principle in Simmenthal. Does this comment imply that the 
constitutional rules would suddenly become relevant to Community law? If the constitutional 
rules are irrelevant, they can say anything: they are not applicable to Community law anyway. 
See 'Op weg naar constitutionele toetsing in Nederland', De adviezen aan de regering, 
N. C.J.M. Bulletin (1992), at p. 235 ff. 
55 J.A. Hofman, J.W. Sap, I. 'Sewandono, Beginselen van Europees Constitutioneel Recht 
(1994), at p.49. 
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The attribution of competences to the EC institutions at the time of the adoption 
of the treaties, or of any amendments to them, is subject to the approval of the 
Dutch Government and Parliament. They also have the duty to examine whether 
such attribution is compatible with the Constitution. Unlike the situation in most 
other countries, incompatibility does not mean that the Constitution has to be 
modified (or the treaty left unratified); it merely triggers a different procedure 
of parliamentary approval with a qualified majority voting requirement 
corresponding to that for constitutional revisions.56 Moreover, the Constitution 
does not expressly refer to a 'hard core' of constitutional values to be preserved 
against encroachment by means of an international agreement. Once a treaty has 
been approved and ratified in proper constitutional fashion, it is expressly 
declared by the Constitution to be immune from judicial challenge. 
This remarkably generous reception of international (and European) treaties does 
not provide an answer to the question of 'Kompetenz-Kompetenz', which arises 
in the course of the exercise of competences once they have been attributed to 
the EC in accordance with each member states' constitutional requirements. 
Setting the limits to the exercise of competences is a matter of interpretation. 
But the power of interpretation is itself one of the powers atrributed to one of 
the EC institutions, namely the Court of Justice. Acceptance, by the member 
states, of article 164 EC treaty at the time of ratification implies their 
recognition of the Court's authority to interpret the Treaty and to decide whether 
or not the other EC institutions remain within the limits of their powers. 
This 'orthodox' account of the Kompetenz-Kompetenz issue is, as far one 
can tell, unchallenged in the Netherlands. No claims are made for preserving an 
ultimate checking power by national courts on the exercise of Community 
competences. Since the Bosch decision of the Hoge Raad in 1962, the 
jurisdiction of the Court in interpreting Community law is generally accepted. 
One may nevertheless try to imagine how a Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
question could be raised by an applicant (or defendant) before a Dutch court. 
- First, the party would clearly not be allowed to challenge the constitutionality 
of the EC treaty itself or of the parliamentary act of approval. Both are immune 
from judicial review under article 120 of the Constitution. 
- The party should show that a specific act of application of the EC treaty is (a) 
56 This does not mean that the approval of an unconstitutional treaty is tantamount to a 
constitutional revision. The procedure for constitutional revision requires a vote by two 
subsequent Parliaments (and thus an intermediate general election), whereas one qualified 
majority vote of Parliament is enough to approve an unconstitutional treaty. 
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ultra vires and (b) because of this, creates a legal situation which is in clear 
contrast with a substantive provision of the Constitution. 
- The court may then want to check the plausibility of those two propositions 
by referring to the European Court of Justice a preliminary question on the 
validity of the Community act (in answer to proposition (a)) and possibly a 
preliminary question on the interpretation of that act (in order to help elucidate 
proposition (b)). 
- If the Court of Justice fails to give satisfactory answers to those preliminary 
questions, then, just conceivably, the Dutch court might 'rebel' and impose its 
own views on the validity, or the applicability, of the Community act. 
Yet, at present, there is no sign whatsoever that a Dutch court might go 
to such lengths. But then, no really fundamental issues of compatibility of EC 
law and the Constitution have arisen as yet. 
IV. BEYOND THE LAW: THE SEARCH FOR EXPLANATIONS 
The prevailing attitude towards international and European law is one of 
striking receptivity in principle, combined with cautious pragmatism in the 
application. 
1. The traditional openness of the Dutch legal system 
As is clear from this paper, the receptivity of the Dutch legal order 
towards Community law is part of the larger and longer story of its receptivity 
to international law. Explanations must therefore also look at this underlying 
internationalist attitude, rather than focus exclusively on European law. 
Part of the explanation may be the historical tradition of the Dutch school 
of international law. It may be tempting to draw a straight line from Grotius' 
Mare Liberum to the radical version of pacta sunt servanda espoused by Dutch 
internationalist doctrine. Since Grotius' time, this idealist attitude was in the best 
national interest. The traditional receptivity to international rules, and willingness 
to cooperate with foreign nations is clearly in the interest of a small trading 
nation, that is too small to preserve its independence on its own, and needs open 
borders for its prosperity. This connection is appropriately made in the title of 
a study of the history of Dutch foreign policy, Voorhoeve's Peace; Profits and 
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Principles. 57 
The· receptivity to international law may be considered as the combined 
result of national interest and internationalist ideology. Dutch jurists and 
politicians often (even today) bring a missionary spirit to international relat~op~. 
They pretend to contribute to world order by setting an example. Loft~ p~nci­
ples are combined with a rather pragmatic application of those pnnc1ples, 
without causing any real disruptions of the domestic legal order. 
There seem to be no impediments against this openness in the Constitution, nor 
in the constitutional values underlying it. There seems to be no clear 
'Grundnorm'. 
When a number of other European countries decided, in the immediate 
post-war period, to adapt their constitution to the new requirements of 
international cooperation and European integration, they typically did so by 
clauses allowing for 'limitations of sovereignty' 58 . The creation of international 
organisations with often far-reaching powers was declared to be compatible with 
the preservation of national sovereignty (albeit in an updated form). Yet, the 
principle of sovereignty also indicates a limit which should not be overstepped 
and which may become meaningful with further progress of integration (cf. the 
post-Maastricht decisions in France and Germany). 
There is no such thing in the Netherlands. The 1953 Constitution allowed 
treaties to confer "certain powers with respect to legislation, administration and 
jurisdiction" on international organizations.59 The term 'sovereignty' is not 
used. Indeed, that term is altogether absent from the Constitution of the Nether-
lands. As for legal doctrine, its view of the concept of sovereignty is ambiguous 
and fluctuating. In a leading textbook of constitutional law, it is said that the 
concept of sovereignty is of limited use; the author even adds, without further 
explanation, that the Dutch state is no longer sovereign with regard to the 
powers attributed to the EC !60 In an advisory opinion of 1984, dealing with the 
then controversial issue of the placing of nuclear missiles on Dutch territory, the 
57 J.J.C. Voorhoeve, Peace, Profits and Principles, a Study of Dutch Foreign Policy 
(1979) 
58 Cf. French, Italian, German Constitutions. 
59 Article 67 of the 1953 Constitution. Since 1983, article 92 of the Constitution. 
60 C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutioneel recht (1990), pp.46-47 
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Council of State took a similarly cavalier view of sove:eignty.61 It held that the 
conclusion of any international agreement implied a loss of sovereignty and that, 
therefore, the concept of sovereignty could not provide guidance as to which 
international treaties were unconstitutional and therefore required approval 
according to a more exacting procedure than ordinary treaties. Treaties were 
only unconstitutional if they conflicted with specific constitutional provisions, 
not with some abstractly defined core that would go under the name of 
sovereignty or any similar term (contrast with the German Constitutional Court 
in the 'Maastricht' decision !). As a consequence, the idea that there is an 
entrenched and untouchable 'constitutional core' does not play a meaningful role 
in Dutch constitutional doctrine, and cannot act as a limit to the 'incoming tide' 
of Community law. 
A negative element of explanation (which is therefore difficult to prove) 
is the absence, in the Netherlands, of a centralised constitutional co'urt which 
could set itself the task of protecting the core values of the Dutch constitution 
(as 'such courts tend to do in other countries). Instead, there is a variety of 
autonomous courts (the Supreme Court being merely a sort of 'primus inter 
pares'), none of which thinks of itself as the supreme guardian of the 
constitutional order. The Dutch constitutional context thus seemed ideal for the 
acceptance of monism, direct effect and supremacy. 
2. Separation of powers and the judicial function 
Yet, in another respect, the absence of a constitutional court -or any other 
form of judicial review of statutes- had a negative impact on the acceptance of 
the supremacy of international law. Article 131 of the Constitution read until 
1983: 'statutes are inviolable'.62 Admittedly, article 131 was designed only to 
deny the judges the power to review the constitutionality of statutes. But this 
conception of the position of judges in relation to the other state organs did 
influence the debate on the constitutional reform with regard to treaty law. It 
was precisely the reason why the Government had left the article 65 (on the 
supremacy of treaty law) outside the initial proposal for the constitutional 
revision. In the Government's opinion it was the responsibility of Parliament, 
not of the judges, to ensure that no conflicts would arise between treaties and 
statutes, just as it was Parliament's responsibility to control the constitutionality 
61 An English version of the central parts of the Opinion can be found in the Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law (1984) 320. 
62 The article was amended and re-numbered in 1983. Article 120 now reads: 'The judge 
will not review the constitutionality of statutes and treaties'. 
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of statutes. The Government saw no reason to make a disctinction between the 
two situations with regard to the respective function of the state organs. As 
described above, the review power of the judges with regard to treaty law was 
introduced on insistance of Parliament itself. This new competence was framed 
in a wording that could have suggested a change in the constitutional position 
of the judges in relation with the other state organs. But in 1956, the 
Government insisted on the introduction of the specification "binding on 
anyone" in the article on supremacy, in order to elucidate that the article did not 
give the judges the competence to interfere with he functions of the Government 
and Parliament where a treaty provisions was addressed to the latter organs, and 
not to individuals. 
Even after the introduction of articles 65 and 66, entailing an express 
empowerment of the judges to control the observance of international obligations 
-though limited to self-executing provisions- judges refrained from using this 
newly attributed power. The main reason probably lies in the fact that there was 
no experience with judicial scrutiny of statutes, due to the absence of a 
constitutional court and given the constitutional ban on judicial review. Articles 
65 and 66 gave the judges competences which were in fact alien to a long 
constitutional tradition63 . At the same time, article 131 remained unaltered. This 
brought the judges in an odd position: they could now set aside statutes thought 
to violate certain international obligations, but at the same time, the inviolability 
of these statutes against any judicial review of their constitutionality was 
maintained.64 The judges probably felt reluctant to use their new cornpetences 
and to review what were constitutionally described as 'inviolable' statutes, not 
because they did not want to give more weight to international treaty obligations 
than to a national statute, but because these new competences, although 
constitutionally recognised, clashed with their traditional role. Only when 
encouraged by another, 'supra-national' court65the Court of Justice, the Dutch 
judges started to assume their new constitutional task. 
63 T. Koopmans, 'Receptivity and its Limits: the Dutch Case' in In Memoriam J.D.B. 
Mitchell (1983), 91 at p, 94 
64 Ibid. 
65 See Hoge Raad, Bosch, 18 May 1962, N.J. (1965), 115 
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3. Judicial empowerment? 
When the Hoge Raad accepted that the direct effect issue was one of 
interpretation that, for Community law, could properly be addressed to the Court 
of Justice, it may well have felt relieved. This meant that, at least for the direct 
effect issue, it could share responsibility with another, 'supra-national' court; and 
when that other court decided that a provision of the Treaty produced direct 
effect, the courts may have felt less 'awkward' to set aside what in the national 
constitutional context were 'inviolable' statutes. 
The Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos and Costa ENEL did not 
empower the Dutch judges in the sense that it obliged them to assume a new 
function (as was the case in Belgium) nor did it convince lower courts to do 
what was under the Constitution the exclusive competence of the supreme court 
of the land (as was the case in Italy): all Dutch courts already possessed these 
competeo.ces under the Constitution. But the fact that the Court of Justice in Van 
Gend en Loos accepted the role of 'accomplice' may well have encouraged the 
Dutch courts to excercise their constitutionally recognized powers against the 
national Legislature. 
4. The Comparative Dimension as a Factor in the Explanation 
One of the factors traditionally inhibiting Dutch courts and legal writing 
from shedding all reservations towards international law were the flaws in the 
general enforcement mechanisms of international law. Before the Second World 
War, this fact was particularly obvious. When presenting, in 1937, the reaso~.s 
pleading for the recognition of supremacy by national courts, yrofessor V ~rZlJ! 
had to acknowledge the existence of what he called 'practical reservatiOns 
against his view. If international law displayed genuine force in the international 
community, he would not have any doubts in defending its absolute 
supremacy.66 But would it be wise for the Netherlands to act as the 'Don 
Quichote of international law' 67 by enforcing international law to its fullest 
extent at a time (1937!) when so many other nations trampled its norms? On 
balance, he concluded that the Netherlands should do it: the fight for the 
building of a genuine international legal order was a matter which was too 
serious and important for humanity as to permit desertion.68 
66 Verzijl, op.cit., at p.56. 
67 Id., p.57. 
68 Ibid. 
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Things appeared in a different light after the Second World War .. The 
change in the legal climate, heralded by the UN Charter and the regwnal 
European agreements, as well as the examples of some other Constitutions 
(notably the French) convinced the Dutch Parliament to inscribe the supremacy 
of international treaties into the Constitution. Yet, some of the old fears about 
'going it alone' had not disappeared. Van Panhuys, after presenting the ~adical 
innovations of 1953, commented: "it cannot be denied that a state acceptmg the 
new principle runs certain risks as ~ong as its example has not been. fol~ow~d .. ~1 
all other civilized countries, but this should not be a reason for reJectmg 1t. 
Those doubts may well account for the partial retreat effected by the 1956 
amendments to the Constitution, and for the restrictive application of the new 
constitutional provisions by Dutch courts. Hence the importance of the European 
Court's case-law also for the Dutch legal order. By diffusing the 'Dutch 
approach' to the other countries of the EC (at least with ~efere~ce to the 
Community treaties), the Court of Justice has ended the 1solatwn of the 
Netherlands and has thereby helped the Dutch courts to take their Constitution 
seriously and to recognise the direct effect and supremacy of international 
treaties more bravely than before. 
5. Judicial dialogue 
Dutch courts seem never to allude to the jurisprudence of the national 
courts of the other Member States. However, rather than demonstrating an 
unwillingness on the side of the Dutch courts to be inspired by the judicial 
reasoning of their counterparts in other countries, this is probably due to the fact 
that the Dutch legal order offers all the necessary tools to comply with the 
requirements of Community law, in a dialogue with the European Court of 
Justice. 
Ever since the Hoge Raad accepted the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice 
in the Bosch case, the Dutch courts have frequently made use of article 177.70 
But also in cases where no reference is made, the Dutch courts often refer to the 
case-law of the Court of Justice, without ever doubting its jurisdiction or openly 
rejecting its judgments. 
69 See Van Panhuys, footnote 6 
70 In 1993, the Court of Justice answered 43 questions coming from Dutch courts. Only 
German courts referred more questions. See Eleventh Annual Report on Monitoring the 
Application of Community Law (1993), COM(94) 500, 417-418. 
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The Dutch courts are receptive to the message from Luxembourg, but 
seem not to need inspiration from their counterparts in other states. Conversely, 
the Dutch constitutional system appears to have exerted its influence on the case 
law of the Court of Justice, and through it on that of other Member States. But 
also more directly, the Dutch constitutional system may well have inspired the 
evolution of other national courts. References to the Dutch Constitution -
although often very concise and sometimes presenting a too idyllic picture- can 
be found in many textbooks, articles and judgments. 
But not only its principles, also its scheme may well have influenced other 
legal systems. In Belgium, for instance, Procureur-General Hayoit de Termicourt 
proposed in his Mercuriale of 1963, to distinguish between self-executing treaty 
provisions, which would take precedence, and non self-executing provisions, 
which would have to give way to national statutes. The distinction appeared 
convenient, because it gave the Cour de Cassation the possibility to adopt a new 
approach without having to overrule its earlier case law. Also, he said, only in 
the case of self-executing provisions would conflicts arise. There is no proof that 
Hayoit de Termicourt intended to copy the Dutch pattem71 , but in an article of 
1965, Waelbroeck72 commented that 'the fact that the Dutch Constitution 
makes the power to review national legislation in the light of treaty provisions 
conditional upon their being directly applicable, is no sufficient reason to adopt 
the same approach in Belgium.' 73 
Likewise, there is a striking parallel with the approach of the European 
Communities Act of the United Kingdom which makes primacy of Community 
law over municipal law conditional upon direct effect, by reference to the 
71 Hayoit de Termicourt gave a short overview of the approach adopted in several other 
European countries. 
72 M. Waelbroeck, 'Le juge beige devant le droit international et le droit communautaire', 
R.B.D.l. (1965) 348 at p. 356; P. Pescatore, case note under Franco-Suisse le Ski, C.D.E. 
(1971) also points at the parallellism with the Dutch system. 
73 Ganshof van der Meersch agreed with this point of view in a footnote in his Mercuriale 
of 1968 (Ganshof van der Meersch, Reflexions stir le droit international et le revision de la 
Constitution, Mercuriale prononcee a !'audience solennelle de rentree de la Cour de cassation 
le 2 septembre 1968, J.T. (1968) 485 at pp. 493-494, and note 142); however, in his Opinion 
to the Franco-Suisse le Ski case he proposed direct effect as a condition for supremacy, since 
only then there is a conflict of norms (Opinion of Procureur-General W.J. Ganshof van der 
Meersch in the case of the Belgian State v S.A. Franco-Suisse le Ski) 
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concept of the "enforceable Community right".74 
6. Legal pragmatism 
A factor which is difficult to pin down but plays an important role, in our 
opinion, is the practical mind of Dutch jurists and politicians, and their aversion 
from theoretical constructions and disputes. In relation, more specifically, to this 
subject, there is a striking lack of interest for 'constitutional fundamentals'. 
Issues which inflame the minds of scores of constitutionalists in countries like 
Germany and Italy fail to attract controversy. 
In this way, the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy of Community law have 
become so self-evident in the Netherlands that the contoversies about the 
relation between Community law and national constitutional law, existing in 
other Member States, are · difficult to explain to younger generations of 
lawyers.75 
74 Pescatore, 'The Doctrine of "Direct Effect": An Infant Disease of Community Law', 
E.L.R. (1983) 155 at p. 157 
75 A.W.H. Meij, Prejudicii!le vragen van Nederlandse rechters en hun gevolgen, 
Preadvies, Vereniging voor de vergelijkende studie van het recht van Belgie en Nederland 
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